We consider a model where players can actively form a limited number of links with other players to play a general class of size-dependent coordination games. This class of games includes multi-person binary action coordination games, minimum effort games, average opinion games, and others, and it is mainly characterized by strategic complementarities among actions. Whenever players may only support links to a relatively small number of other players, the most efficient convention will be selected, irrespective of the details of the size-dependent coordination games. When the linking constraint becomes less restrictive, the most efficient convention will still be selected, provided that the most efficient action delivers a relatively high output when played against a small group also using it. Furthermore, for the special case of size-dependent minimum effort games, the second most efficient convention may be selected.

崔志伟，威尼斯官网娱乐场副教授，曾在埃塞克斯大学经济系（Department of Economics, the University of Essex）进行访问研究。研究兴趣为网络博弈理论及应用、博弈学习理论及应用、行为经济学理论、微观经济理论。主持完成/在研国家自然科学基金项目三项，在Journal of Economic Theory、Games and Economic Behavior、Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization、Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control、Journal of Mathematical Economics等国际主流经济学期刊发表论文十余篇。相关研究成果被David Levine（Econometrica前联合主编、专著《The Theory of Learning in Games》共同作者）、Carlos Alós-Ferrer（Journal of Economic Psychology 联合主编）、William H. (Bill) Sandholm（JET、TE、GEB前副主编、专著《Population games and evolutionary dynamics》作者）等所引用或跟踪拓展。